

<b>DISPATCH</b>		<b>KAPOK</b> <b>S E C R E T</b>	<b>SYMBOL AND NO.</b> <b>Dg. ECOW-1653</b>
TO INFO	Chief of Station, Germany Attn: [ ] and [ ] Chief of Base, Munich Chief of Base, Frankfurt	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 74-124-29/3	
FROM	Chief, SR	DATE 30 JUN 1960	
SUBJECT	REDWOOD/REDSKIN/AERODYNAMIC Improvement of KUNZE Product of AERODYNAMIC Project	RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ACTION REQUIRED	Acceptance of ABCASSOWARY/29's assignment to Frankfurt to be directed by FOB	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
REFERENCE(S)			

1. The coincidence of two observations concerning current KUNZE activities led Headquarters to re-examine carefully the operational possibilities of the AERODYNAMIC Project. First, it was observed that constant efforts over several years to derive substantial KUNZE yield from expensive operations involving emigre organizations as now constituted and as now directed by KUBARK have proved utterly abortive. Second, it was observed that comparatively substantial KUNZE KURENE yield had been reaped from short-term trips by legal travelers - particularly Americans - who had been briefed and trained by KUBARK to simply use their eyes and ears, their memories and sometimes their cameras, with reference to requirements (most often physical targets) of interest to us.

2. In re-examining our emigre projects generally, all the familiar empirically established limitations on their exploitability for classical espionage purposes were recognized; particularly, the predominating self-interest of emigre organizations, their insecurity as a result of opposition penetration or blabber among their members or both, and their intractability. It appeared, however, that the exploitation of the ABCASSOWARY/1 organization specifically, in contrast with perhaps all the rest, is not critically limited by these factors and not limited by some of them at all. As set forth in detail in the attachment hereto, there has never been any problem with the tractability of the ABCASSOWARY/1 organization, nor, insofar as we have been able to judge over a 12-year period, with its security. While its self-interest predominates by very definition, I have personally confirmed by conversation with ABCASSOWARY/2 that he sees that self-interest coinciding almost precisely with the interests of OBYENKE. (The only aberration is apparently where the former espouses the cause of nationalist separatism and the latter overtly professes non-predetermination - which divergence is hardly likely to affect ABCASSOWARY/1-KUBARK cooperation.)

3. We therefore concluded that the inadequate KUNZE yield from the AERODYNAMIC Project, assuming as we still do that the potential is there, stems not from limitations inherent in the ABCASSOWARY/1 organization, but from our own omission to take the measures best calculated to realize that potential. Therefore, as explained in detail in the attachment, we have taken the time and trouble to set up an organizational and procedural system, to clear, train and brief key personnel, and to press ABCASSOWARY/2 exhaustively to supply the basic "GI" (biographic profiles and "who-knows-who" studies on all his assets) conspicuously lacking in the past. All this we have done in the hope that we can thereby significantly tap the relatively large number of Ukrainian emigre travelers to the Soviet Ukraine, as well as Soviet Ukrainians traveling in the West, for KUNZE profit at least in the form of visual-aural observation reports and at most in the form of recruited reporting sources inside the Soviet Union.

4. The operational desirability of making this effort strikes us as threefold: first, we would enlarge and sophisticate the spotting and assessing capabilities of ABCASSOWARY/1 with resultant benefit to operations run by us unilaterally or through them; second, we would achieve considerable proliferation of our capability to run the short-term briefed traveler type of operation and at the same time perhaps liberate some case officer strength, hitherto preoccupied by this type of endeavor,

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FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS SI-28, SI-28A AND SI-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO. <b>1</b>
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for concentration on the longer range, more difficult task of establishing inside classification assets; and third, we would be in a position to run the short-term briefed traveler type of operation without attributability to ODEME, which seems particularly significant in this early post-S-2 era.

5. We think it highly desirable that ARCASSOARY/29 be stationed in Frankfurt rather than in Munich for a number of reasons, principal among which are Frankfurt's remoteness from the curious eyes and ears of the dominant espionage community in Bavaria and the greater convenience of Frankfurt as a starting point for speedy transportation to various parts of Western Europe. He should be handled and directed by a case officer in the Soviet Branch or FOB because his work is directly in line with the mission of that branch. We are well aware of the personnel shortage of which the Base has repeatedly complained but, if we are right in our expectation that this Project will multiply KURSK cases far beyond the capability of a single case officer to handle directly, we should think that FOB would consider it desirable to assign one case officer the responsibility of managing it full time. Your attention is invited in this regard to the fact that ARCASSOARY/29 can be handled in English, nor do we believe that the case officer need have a Ukrainian background. Indeed, while some knowledge of Ukrainian affairs would undoubtedly enhance the case officer's rapport with ARCASSOARY/29, we believe that any good case officer will quickly acquire such knowledge sufficient for the purpose and that the absence of Ukrainian background on the part of the case officer may well enhance his ability to direct the Project with a completely objective eye to the interests of KURSK exclusively.

6. You will note in the attachment that we are providing ARCASSOARY/29 with the documentation he needs to travel easily to other European countries. Needless to say, we would welcome any suggestions you may have for a better arrangement.

7. Since ARCASSOARY/2 is about to travel to Europe in July on the routine business of his organization as well as ARCASSOARY/1 activities connected with the Olympic games in Rome, and since it appears highly desirable that he personally introduce ARCASSOARY/29 to various ARCASSOARY/1 contacts and assets in Western Europe, we should like to get ARCASSOARY/29 to the field as soon as possible. If he could get there in time to exploit the Congress of Historians commencing in Sweden on 16 August, so much the better. Our exploratory discussion with Chief, WE Division has shown a disposition on his part to cooperate as fully as the realities of liaison considerations will permit, and we propose to coordinate closely with WE Division those ARCASSOARY/1 activities which affect West European countries. Your earliest favorable consideration of this matter would therefore be most appreciated and, upon receipt of your concuring views and comments, we shall prepare to dispatch ARCASSOARY/29 to Frankfurt promptly.

8. A biographic profile of ARCASSOARY/29 follows.

[ ]

Attachment: As noted above

28 June 1960

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee (w/att)
- 2 - GOB, Munich (w/att)
- 2 - GOB, Frankfurt (w/att)
- 1 - RI (w/att)
- 2 - SR/3 (w/att)

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Att. to EOW-1653  
30 June 1960

1. Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to acquaint addressees with measures Headquarters has taken and proposes for the promotion or augmentation of the operational capabilities of AMBASSY/1, particularly regarding PI collection via KEDSKIN and contact operations. This does not represent the launching of a new project, but an endeavor systematically to revitalize and expand an old one.

2. Summary of Past Activities: While several readers are already familiar with Project AMBASSY/1, the present status of the project and Headquarters plans can be best put in perspective by a brief review of the past. Project AMBASSY/1 is older than any other going KEDSKIN project involving groups of erstwhile Soviet citizens. The original organization of which AMBASSY/1 is an off shoot, was an anti-Soviet political organization founded on present day Soviet Ukrainian soil during World War II as the governing body of an independence movement. Both in name and in program the Ukrainian liberation movement was and is widely known throughout the Ukraine through its partisan welfare and anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet propaganda activities, which were conducted in an organized centralized manner on Soviet soil from 1943 until approximately 1953. Towards the end of World War II, a representation of the parent governing group in the Ukraine, i.e., AMBASSY/1, was ordered abroad to seek liaison with and aid from Western governments to further the Ukrainian nationalist cause. Most members of AMBASSY/1 had been in one way or another directly involved with Ukrainian nationalist intelligence operations in the late 1930's and during World War II. By 1946 they were already trying to re-establish from Western Europe reliable, covert communications with underground headquarters in the Ukraine. More than any other Ukrainian group abroad, AMBASSY/1's target audience has been the population of the Ukraine and not the emigration.

In 1948, under Project IDEN, KUBARK examined the KEDSKIN potential of all major emigre groups in Europe composed of World War II Soviet defectors. Out of about 30 groups studied, AMBASSY/1 was selected as the organization best qualified for clandestine KEDSKIN operations with KUBARK. Since 1948, activities under this project have fallen into three distinct eras:

a. The years from 1948 to 1953 included active KEDSKIN KUTSH operations with minor attention to KURAKH and KITIMOVIC. Although emphasis during this period was on PI production, the vagaries of intermittent communications by courier and V/T with AMBASSY/1 forces in the Ukraine did not permit anywhere near as favorable PI and operational results as KUBARK expected. Nonetheless, AMBASSY/1 KEDSKIN PI results, which admittedly seem meager compared with what is available via other types of operations today, were decidedly superior to those of other KEDSKIN endeavors of those years, in the

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position of KGB on Soviet Party Board. It was, however, all too clear by the early 1950's that KGB power, which in the USSR was then used to control all foreign & economic affairs, had gone so far that only the most naive would then consider the USSR to remain, after such a situation, still either unruled out, because no valid norm potential was available.

- b. On June 1953 or 1956 two assassinations by KGB agents and a few kidnappers occurred. On the former case one would suppose the two agents involved had been given the go-ahead to kill via the open route or otherwise to kill him to the max. The other case concerned with a kidnapped Soviet diplomat, KGB agent, who was probably kidnapped because his work as a diplomat was considered to be threatening to KGB or Russia.
- c. Between 1953 until 1959 was the beginning of time the notorious "KGB", originally known as "KGB" counterespionage division of Soviet Intelligence and Security Agency, the first prominent KGB agent, unfortunately and obviously, became assassinated via a double-crossing case as KGB agent X's name was never in the USSR.

The next major counter effort took place in 1959 at the "Vienna Crisis". Although KGB's team of agents could spot, knew and were important of all, two over to Soviet disaffected forces, communists who unlike their more militarily to expand. (See Case History 1, in KGB, dated 10 June 1959.) The major ARKHOVSKY/2 case occurs in 1959 took place at the Vienna road festival and at the Hungarian Trade Fair respectively. While existing conditions on the latter events were less propitious than at Brussels, interesting facts on anti-Soviet Unrest there were played up and the ARKHOVSKY/2 agents again demonstrated their ability both to set up and the ARKHOVSKY/2 agents again demonstrated their ability both to set up and disaffected anti-Soviet communists and to operate closely and well with them.

The ARKHOVSKY was one KGB operation in summer 1959 involving a young couple with Yugoslav citizenship. Although he was in the USSR for only a week, our man KGB disaffecteds and several basis on valuable KGB information resulted from his trip.

Intelligence on the Soviet Unrest was also eliminated as the result of an ARKHOVSKY/2 agent's trip to Moscow where he talked to communists who had access to information from the Unrest project.

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**3. Major Deficiencies in Past Project AGRASSOWSKI Operations:**

AGRASSOWSKI/1 KURAKIN and contact operations over the past three years have been makeshift and by no means worthy of the opportunities available, nor of A/1's apparent potential. Many of the following deficiencies have stemmed, in large part at least, from KURAKIN's omission to assign staffers to the project, both at Headquarters and in the field, adequate in number to either the expense (now  annually) or the potential of the project:

a. The AGRASSOWSKI have not been adequately familiar with our strategic concepts, procedures and objectives; in addition, there have been no AGRASSOWSKI/1 personnel professionally trained by us and qualified to run operations as competently as some of our better contract singletons.

b. AGRASSOWSKI/2, the leader of the group and the man with the greatest amount of operational experience and responsibility, has been too busy himself and has not delegated enough authority to those subordinates who have worked with us briefly and on specific operations such as the Brusseis Plan. A/2's tight control of operations and his location in New York City, away from direct frequent case officer contact, have tended to inhibit both the planning and the conduct of operations.

c. During the years 1953 to 1958, mostly at our expense, KURAKIN activities (black radio, mailing to the Ukraine of publications for Soviet Ukrainians) expanded, with the result that the AGRASSOWSKI had little time or money left to spend on KURAKIN.

d. From roughly 1946 until summer 1958, the AGRASSOWSKI had a somewhat clouded, outdated picture of Soviet Ukrainian public opinion and of basic intelligence on Soviet reality needed to mount efficient KURAKIN or contact operations.

e. Briefing and training of KURAKIN legal travel agents handled by the AGRASSOWSKI has been inadequate by KURAKIN standards.

f. No deliberate system has been established for the quick transmission of AGRASSOWSKI/1 leads or other operational information to KURAKIN or for the consequent timely issuance of KURAKIN guidance or for prompt KURAKIN intrusion in the operation.

**4. Headquarters Action to Correct These Deficiencies:**

a. To get the AGRASSOWSKI thinking more in our own terms, AGRASSOWSKI/15 and 29 were given, at Headquarters, the most extensive and thorough training and briefing program (see paragraph 5 below) just administered to members of a KURAKIN exile group.

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b. For our own account and A/C have purchased 6 radios. One radio and some electronic equipment belonging to A/C was given to him but he returned it to A/C and A/C is paying him to compensate with KAPOK and nothing is actually being paid by us to him.

c. The Black radio purchased from KAPOK has been used, including now A/C can have for other uses than radio making and trade. d. During the meeting of A/C and A/P, Headquarters has not given them or operations, due to quality of our sources and we have to make sure they do not do any unnecessary damage to our sources. We also do not necessarily apprehend. (That is, we could be apprehended, but only if major and all personnel view of the situation, public opinion, living conditions, political climate, etc. In the Soviet Union we practice and fully will with KAPOK information can come from us via direct conversations with Soviet Government and, via publications or remaining contacts, via writing of several hundred letters from the Ukraine and through regular study of news & series Ukrainian publications.)

e. We have detailed into A/C Headquarters 2, 15 and 19 that careful selection, assessment and training are indispensable to productive operators.

f. We have brought A/C to realize that the level of future support of his organization depends on good results in operations supervised by KAPOK. Fortunately, he has always been just as interested in contact with reporting sources in the Ukraine as we, even though his methods to get them have been erratic or unrepresented by our methods. In addition, due to his organization, to remain vital, must either improve its touch with the Ukraine or either. In addition, he claims to be in full accord with our efforts to professionalize the operational methods of his organization.

g. Headquarters has communicated to the our satisfaction that there will be no conflict between the KAPOK and Ukraine operations at A/C. I.e., [ ] the Amambassadors have no mutual areas. (During P. note, in parentheses above, running over disconnected Soviet territories belonging to Ukraine).

15. Personnel, Training, Security and Communications. That those personnel I have to offer Ukraine in terms of personnel, as stated A/C has requested names in how to compare, those individuals whom we can have based on their clandestine activities on behalf of A/C Headquarters. Most of them have degrees from Western universities and may have graduate degrees. Presently, their cover for being in the area is that of graduate students. Th-

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other cases they are professional and who have become educated citizens. In ADDITION A/3 and 39, A/2 has given us two men whom operational experience over half of the remaining or more than half the U. S. Air Service men, the better trained and more talented of A/2's operational personnel will be placed under A/39 and those in North and South America under A/3. In Vietnam, the local A/2 resident agent happens also to be an agent of the French military [ ] [ ]. Local contact with a French air officer can obviously be set up if required.

A/3 is an associate of A/2 since he has been designated via A/2 since the fall of 1960 in the same manner since 1959. Regarding A/3, although he had taken part in A/2 conduct operations in Vietnam, Taiwan, and elsewhere, he was conducting or an unknown quantity to himself until he arrived in the U.S. in 1960 after completing studies at an American university (see later section). Following various assignments of A/39 and recent placement of A/35, both men began a flight training program, including the two weeks of Photography and so. The program ended on 10 June, 1961, when final two were assigned to executive or administrative functions and other personnel training.

It is important to note that A/2 exists in several operationally separate from other units units in the Bureau itself. For example, one source of the ADDITIONAL authority to represent the corporate interests underground and determine relationships in the Bureau did not originate in the organization. The ADDITIONAL here not total to those in the organization, to coordinate the activities or to jockey for the approval of the organization, to the extent other groups here. Full-blown members of the A/1 organization were eliminated in the Bureau during or after W.W. II. There are only about 12 in A/1. ACTIVE MEMBER operations over recent years. Non A/1 agents were at the Bureau's party and their resident agents in several foreign countries are sympathizers, co-opted supporters and in some cases employees, but not full-blended members of the group. A/3 and 39 fall in the non-operational employee category. They are former active members of the Bureau's underground movement and dedicated to the A/1 organization during or after the war.

Compared with other exile organizations from the USSR, the majority former members of an underground, they are generally to adhere to and not just talk about the need-to-know principle and compartmentation of operations. We have 12 years of operational experience with them as much to bear this conclusion. Since they are not interested in accepting new members into their

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inner circle, it would presumably be hard for the KIS to penetrate them via an outsider. Some bogus couriers were sent to them from the Ukraine in the late 1940's and early 1950's, it is true, but they automatically refused to take the chance of using any post-World War II defector or former courier in their sensitive operations no matter how reliable he seems. Obviously, Headquarters has no evidence yet that the inner circle of the A/1 group has been penetrated or is insecure.

As far as their honesty and cooperativeness towards KURAKH are concerned, after many years of cooperation we have no grounds for significant complaint.

6. Basic Agreement with AGRICULTURE/2: The following agreement was negotiated with A/2 in early 1950:

- a. From the A/2 side, A/15 is designated as Chief of Operations; he will continue to reside in Washington and will take direction from KURAKH; planned legal travel and contact operations in the Western Hemisphere will be his responsibility.
- b. All appropriate operational contacts and data for the accomplishment of his mission will be transferred to A/15 by A/2.
- c. A/2 need not be consulted on operational matters, but may be kept generally advised of operational activity by A/15 or KURAKH directly. He has agreed to impart this information to no one, expressing his confidence that his colleagues in the A/1 ruling council will be satisfied by A/2's assurance that he knows and approves what is going on.
- d. A/29 is senior operations officer for Europe, will take direction from KURAKH, and will receive from A/2 all unique contacts necessary for his planning and contact operations mission.
- e. Neither A/15 nor A/2 will enter unduly into problems connected with A/29's operations, except in the rare instance where A/2 feels the operation conflicts with A/1 basic interests. However, A/15 will receive a copy of A/29's routine reports from the Headquarters desk officer to be held in a secure area (unclassified property) together with his own operational records. Only KURAKH communications channels will be used to convey sensitive information from A/29 to A/15 or A/2.
- f. Knowledge of A/1 or KURAKH Ukrainian operations will be restricted on the A/1 side to those who need to know (cf. sub-paragraph c above).
- g. A/2, 15 and 29 will generally respect KURAKH's option to remove a lead or operation for unilateral KURAKH development.
- h. No formal written protocol to define this agreement will be prepared.

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7.

b. REBELLION remains interested in using REBELLION as a channel for sending to prospective Soviet citizens or as a recruitment center for sending it to bases only occasionally on the numbers of those persons whom operations with the ANARCHISTS listed in paragraph 2 above. REBELLION intent is not precisely based on information noted by REBELLION with regard to identity of the ANARCHISTS. None of the more important latter points are:

  - a. Any of the Soviet citizens abroad who have accepted REBELLION recruitments by REBELLION have been REBELLION.
  - b. In a majority of the better Soviet cities REBELLION cases, the double agent has been a REBELLION nationalist.
  - c. More REBELLION agents have travelled legally to the USSR in the past two years than REBELLION agents.
  - d. As far as REBELLION is concerned, the existence of REBELLION in the USSR has caused to be recognizable of REBELLION nationalists has been openly noted in recent years by Soviet tourists to the USSR, by persons dealing with Soviet REBELLION travelling abroad, in reports from the Soviets and by the Soviet REBELLION press, which has discussed the problem of nationalism in the USSR virtually daily. As any example of this type of reporting REBELLION has been getting to REBELLION nationalists all over or the better REBELLION-controlled areas of the Soviet Union.

    ] reported talking at first hand with REBELLION nationalists further, according to ] "The largest number of requests for political asylum (during the REBELLION rule) are for delivery of letters to Vice President Nixon from REBELLION, who view their country to identify themselves as such to differentiate themselves from REBELLION."

  - e. Comparative experience shows that the ANARCHISTS are more able than other REBELLION agents to turn out and win up for recruitment disaffected REBELLION nationalists in or from the USSR.
  - f. REBELLION agents have already spotted nine eight interesting prospective REBELLION turners to the Soviet Union for some 1960, two of whom REBELLION probably will send as second REBELLION citizens using the ANARCHISTS as intermediaries or the ANARCHISTS. None of the more important latter points are:

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8. Document now to make a specifically concerned with A/SO documents and other documents, particularly those held by governments for which there is no passport available at Headquarters. It would be best to travel outside of January 1960 and to show a permanent resident card and to an A/SO in lieu of passport bearing a temporary permit. With such a document it would be possible for him to live for extended periods abroad and still return to the U.S. The document is also acceptable to foreign embassies for registration and lengthy sojourn and even permanent residing in those countries. As you are well aware, however, it is sometimes difficult or otherwise confusing to travel outside from one European country to another with this affidavit of residence documents if the two countries are different to obtain. This document is therefore acceptable for A/SO. Several other alternatives and combinations have been considered, including bank-stamped and non-bank-stamped, valid national passports for citizens of various countries are different to obtain. The document is therefore acceptable for use in situations where there will not be time to obtain a visa by means of the legitimate channels. Also, such documentation, while it might still be useful on special occasions, is not safe for regular travel because A/SO is widely known within the European Community and to some extent his presence in a given country will not be secret. The flag potential of an either document is obvious. Thus, basic documentation should, in Headquarters' view, be to true name, which will still allow A/SO maximum freedom of movement. Having considered the documents of various countries available to us, the best solution seems to be a bank-stamped legal residence document.

Thus, basic documentation should, in Headquarters' view, be to true name, which will still allow A/SO maximum freedom of movement. In conjunction with issuance of the Mexican passport, KAPOK will take steps to safeguard A/SO's U.S. citizenship through various diplomatic channels.

9. There is an older option available to the Mexican passport, which is valid for three years. Although the Mexican passport is Legally issued to stand up to scrutiny and investigation, A/SO has nothing to do with this matter. The option of a three year passport on the basis of the trip ends. It should not be necessary for A/SO to obtain Mexican documentation throughout entire period of his use of the passport unless he chooses to renew it legally after two years. In conjunction with issuance of the Mexican passport, KAPOK will take steps to refer to [ ] the recent decision made on this document question.

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10. Headquarters has also weighed with the question of A/2's cover. Obviously his cover should include an active economic role. However, A/2's foreign cultural activities and publications center, as A/2 will be unlikely assigned to commanding A/1, appears and establishes very closely connection with A/1 and A/2. It would seem best to affiliate A/2 with the Foreign Legion or A/1 as opposed to the British Legion in order to justify giving the group A/2's direct control over him and to allow him freedom from command A/1 control. (See Mr. [unclear] all, a fairly junior on the A/1 Legion. He is ordered by name to Madrid from the point of view age, service and position in A/2.) As in A/2's feasibility, however, that his task with A/1 Legion while carrying out similar functions will require in damage to the organization, will not stand up which as ultimate continuity. It are therefore working out an arrangement for a dual responsibility cover job not requiring cover duties or leave of work but involving either an additional agent or a additional part-time job or both or some other form of continuation or commercial employment. This would certainly provide A/2 with some or his financial support and vita reason for his travel. No details have been worked out.

11. From previous American correspondence the field is probably more than A/1 has sufficient operations interests to at least three international, greater extended for this moment. The New Zealand 15 August through 21 September, the Conference of Ministers in Stockholm 16-19 August and, to a lesser extent, events requiring thus A/2 to be in Europe between the middle end of July to above tasks for several months stages which we are negotiating in order to meet this deadline.

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